Mr David : Mr Hooper, if you could bring us through the TARC process in some detail. First of all, the impact of a ministerial direction, in terms of the target approval process, how does that fit in?

Mr Hooper : Ministerial direction basically speaks to, I think, five or six items. I will count them up […]

I do know these. The first principle, of course, is that the rule of law in the conduct of investigations must be observed. Then, there is provisions that speak to what I call “proportionality and instrumentality”. The investigative means must be proportional to the gravity and imminence of the threat. I think that guideline comes back –this guideline and the subsequent ones –come back to the strictly necessary provision. In fact, our targeting policy is an attempt by the service to codify the strictly necessary provision. So the investigative means must concordant with the gravity or the seriousness and imminence of the threat. We need to use intrusive – or the need to use intrusive techniques must be weighed against the possible damage to civil liberties or to fundamental societal institutions. I think that speaks for itself. The more intrusive the technique that you want to use, the higher the authority has to be. The fifth item there comes back what I call “incrementally”. Unless you are confronted with extraordinary circumstances, you walk through the level of investigation, starting with the least intrusive methods. And only when they are unsuccessful, do you move to more intrusive powers. So those are the basic principles.   Page 199

Mr David : Now, there are operational policies that cover this important area of the work that you do. What are the requirements that an agent has to meet in making a TARC request?

Mr Hooper : First of all, I think it is important to know that it is probably axiomatic that the people that on the street working a target environment are the ones who are best situated to have knowledge as to who the targets are or ought to be. But in our system that does not permit an intelligence officer to unilaterally embark on an investigation. You cannot investigate without an authority to conduct an investigation. And the authority derives from a written submission that is made either to a senior manager in the service r to the target authority and review committee.

Mr David : Could you give us some detail concerning the submissions that have to be put in a written request?

Mr Hooper : Again, to reiterate, the section 12 in our threshold for collection, I think it is important to bear in mind that our threshold is reasonable grounds to suspect that an activity may be threatening to the security of Canada.

Mr David : So these grounds have to be documented.

Mr Hooper : These grounds have to be documented, and we have to describe the specific activity that we consider to the threatening. It has to specify the specific threat definition. It is a 2A, 2B or 2C threat? Is it espionage or is it terrorism? It has to identify the collection program, again, CI or counter-intelligence, counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism, which program will have control of the management of the investigation, and it also has to describe the purpose of the investigation. I talked before about national requirements for security intelligence that come to the service by way of ministerial direction. From those requirements, operational branches develop annual plans. The collection that the investigation is designed to satisfy must be concordant with one the items that the service is seeking out of its collection program. In other words, there has to be a direct linkage between the investigation and the national requirement for security intelligence. Page 201

- Règle concernant la production d’une requête de surveillance.

William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Hooper : It is not quite that it is pretty bureaucratic, but not quite that bad yet. There is policy on the ingredients that have to come forward with every request for targeting authority and there is a number of points that have to be addressed. Anyway, that there is policy that makes sure that the requests for targeting authority are complete when they come to committee. Page 70 (2).

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: The first question I have is: I have noted under “Policy” that words have been added to paragraph 1. Before it said:

“The RCMP will not gather information on or investigate organizations engaged in lawful activity.”

Then there was a period there and I asked you about that, you may recall. Now, words have been added to that :

“…unless allegation or intelligence justifies such actions.”

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Why the addition of those words?

Mr Loeppky : The policy was created in support of C-36, the bill that –before, things that might not have been criminal activities, like fundraising, participation, those types of things, this particular change was made to ensure that types of activities that might on their own appear very innocuous could in fact be part of a larger type of criminal investigation. If I can just put some context on that, when I think back to 9/11 incidents, I am not sure that anyone suspected that simply trying to learn how to fly an airplane had any linkage to an incident and yet subsequently that became a key part that there was criticism had been missed. This was to ensure that we had the policy support for that. Page 156.

 - Lorsqu’on surveille une cible, il n’y a pas de politique qui interdit que l’on recueille des informations
sur les personnes qui entrent en contact avec la cible.

William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Waldman : « The following activity do not require targeting approval under this policy: incidental to collection of information and intelligence spin-off, which is disclosable under 19. (2)( a).”

So does that mean if someone has got -- being targeted and has got -- you have got surveillance on that person, and someone like Mr. Arar were to come into casual contact, you could collect the information that Mr. Arar was seen by that person, it could go into your database as a casual intelligence spin-off. Is that fair? Am I understanding it correctly?

  Mr Hooper : It could, but it would also -- it's disclosable under two sections, effectively, section 12 and 12 via 19. (2)( a),which is our -- I guess it's one of the exception that allows for the disclosure of service information. Page 73 (2)

- On peut collecter de l’information sur les personnes qui entrent en contact avec la cible principale.      

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: […] and it states:

1. “As law enforcement is considered one broad consistent use, the RCMP may collect personal information for one law enforcement purpose and release it for another law enforcement purpose.”

Then it goes on:

“A member must not seek or collect personal information solely for the purpose of facilitating inquiries or investigations undertaken by another law enforcement agency …

2. In such a case, a law enforcement or government agency should be advised to seek direct access to the desired information .

I just want to ask you a question here in terms of consistent use disclosure for my understanding, and that is, it talks about collecting personal information for one law enforcement purpose and releasing it for another law enforcement purpose, presumably to another agency, whether it be foreign or not.   The question that I have : Would the information which you have collected on Jim Jones, once again where he is not alleged to have committed or is suspected to have committed any illegal activity, would that be collecting personal information for a law enforcement purpose?

Mr Loeppky : Well, the hypothetical situation that you have outlined is that Jim Jones is meeting with someone, and your hypothetical situation is based on the presumption that Jim Jones is innocent. At that point it is not—[…] But if Mr. Jones comes into the picture and forms part of the file and there is subsequent investigation that may lead to conclusions, then that is certainly a consistent sharing of information under the Privacy Act.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Right. But once again –this is the last time I’m going to ask this question. It is a situation where you don’t suspect that he has engaged in any unlawful activity, the only point is one of association with one of your prime targets, and you have stored away information about Jim Jones in your databank. Is that personal information for the purposes of law enforcement?

Mr Loeppky : It is personal information, yes.

Mr Cavalluzzo : For the purposes of law enforcement?

Mr Loeppky : Because you don’t know at that point what role he plays. He may in fact be a suspect. As long as you share that information, putting the appropriate context around it, that he was seen in company of a target but you have nothing to support anything else because in fact that individual – there may be other pieces that the other organization has that actually tie that in very closely and it is a critical piece of information to them -- .[…]

The Commissioner: As I say, the answer has to be one of three: yes, no or I don’t know.

Mr Cavalluzzo : And the answer is?

Mr Loeppky : Yes. Page 39 (2).

- Absence de politique concernant le ciblage des membres des groupes terroristes

William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Hooper : We really don't have policy that addresses membership in a terrorist organization. There is no service policy that says for a person to be identified as a member of a terrorist organization these elements must be present. […]

I might add, in the case of some terrorist organizations, membership is very difficult to establish under any circumstances. I think in virtually every organization -- and this is particularly true in the terrorism domain -- membership can be at times a very amorphous concept; at other times it is very clearly identifiable.   I don't know that one could draft policy around what constitutes membership that would cover a wide array of organizations that the service investigates, whether they are hostile intelligence services or a terrorist organization. Page 28 (2).

- Absence de politique de ciblage universelle pour tous les groupes terroristes
en raison de l’hétérogénéité de chaque groupe.

William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Hooper : These are all very nebulous terms. I appreciate that. And they are specific to the PKK. It would be very difficult to draw inferences or make conclusions about what information we adduced as constituting membership or activism on behalf of the PKK and overlay that template on another terrorist organization. This is why you won't see these terms codified in our policy, because I don't think it is possible to write policy that would cover the array of targets that we look at. Page 40 (2).

Mr Cavalluzzo : […] Finally, Deputy Commissioner, I want to briefly deal with the relations of the RCMP with the community generally. First of all, refer to Tab 47 which is a brochure entitled –I can’t read that. It is “Islam &”

Mr Loeppky : “Muslim”

Mr Cavalluzzo : Is it “Muslim, What Police Officer Need to Know”.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Is that correct?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : If we look at the “Introduction” on the first page, it states that:

“This booklet is designed to aid police officers in better understanding the Muslim community, their faith and culture.”

I leave this to the parties to read, but there is , it seems to me, an attempt to give a better understanding to police officers to understand the culture and mores of the community with which you are dealing. If we look at the last page we will see that there are certain acknowledgements in respect of this brochure or booklet. For example, we see that the executive director of CAIR-CAN, Mr Saloojee, participated in, I assume, the creation of this booklet. For example, it says:

“For more information please contact: Islamic Social Services Association, Council on American Islamic Relations-Canada…”

I guess there are a few questions I have with respect to there booklet, Deputy Commissioner. Is this booklet begin to members of the RCMP who deal generally with the Muslim and Arab community?

Mr Loeppky : I’m not sure how widely this booklet is distributed.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Right. Is it a creation, though, of the RCMP?

Mr Loeppky : It is one of the initiatives that the RCMP has been involved in. This particular booklet was put together in Manitoba, with some support from our people in terms of review, driven very much by the Muslim community. If I just might comment that this is really just one of the small pieces of outreach I think that has taken place post-9/11. I know the Commissioner immediately post 9/11 met with a significant number of the Muslim community in Toronto in conjunction with his Commissioner’s Advisory Committee on Visible Minorities. We have, in virtually every division, an outreach program with the Muslim community to ensure that we understand their concerns, that they understand our mandate. So those are in place. I can be more specific, but they are in place in every one in different forums and different venues. I think the other point that I would make is that outreach is not a new business to us. We have involved in it since 1986 when the Commissioner of the day established the Visible Minority Advisory Committee. There are similar committees in the provinces, but the Commissioner’ National Advisory Committee, he meets with them twice a year. They are made up of representatives from different visible minorities’ communities across Canada and they bring concerns forward about there sensitivities within communities that we need to adjust to, that we need to be aware of in terms of maintaining the confidence and the ability to police those communities. They provide guidance in terms of how we can do a better job of recruiting and retaining visible minorities that we have in the organization. They bring a community perspective in each one of those meetings, where there is a community meeting with the community that the Commissioner attends. So it is a forum that has been in place for 18 years to really bring together the broad knowledge and the concerns of those communities and, as a result, we have amended our policy on a number of occasions in terms of recruitment and retention. I mean, for example, we recruited –we allowed the East Indian to wear the turban as part of t he significant uniform of the force. So we have been very responsive to various issues that they have to raised over the years and we continue to be.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Finally, I just want you to identify that Tab 48 is the mandate of the advisory committee that you were just referring to. Just ensure you identify that.

Mr Loeppky : Yes, that is correct. I guess the only further comment I would make is we have come out with a very strong statement about bias-free policing that has been provided to every member of the organization and it speaks to respect, it speaks to providing professional service in conjunction with, obviously, the law and in conjunction with our values as an organization.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Right. I am going to just finally ask you these questions because they came up in the questioning of CSIS. That is, I assume if you were aware that some of your officers were asking questions to members of the Muslim faith as: Do you consider yourself religious? How many times per day do you pray? What mosque do you belong to? That you would feel that these questions are totally inappropriate?

Mr Loeppky : There is no correlation between religious observance and terrorist activity or criminal activity, and that is very clear.   So as a matter of trying to establish religious practices for personal information, it would be totally inappropriate, but there could be occasions where to further an investigation a question could be asked—

Mr Cavalluzzo : All right

Mr Loeppky :   --that could tie them together. Page 150 (2).

  William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Hooper : […] we have policy that deals with the conduct of operations and how to conduct interviews within minority communities. There are very clear policy admonitions: that we have to identify ourselves to interviewees; we have to explain that their participation and discussions with us is strictly voluntary; we are admonished to take into account the fact that people in a lot of the minority countries derive from places where officials of the security intelligence apparatus might not be as friendly as we are; we are admonished to take into consideration religious beliefs and human rights and privacy concerns. So there is a body of policy that addresses all of these considerations. Quite apart from that body of policy, we have had some preliminary dialogue with representatives of the Canadian Muslim community and the Canadian Islamic Congress. Page 91(2).

Mr Cavalluzzo: Well, let me give you a concrete question then . It is fair to say that in 2002 RCMP officers working on national security investigations would have felt pressure by Americans agencies who were seeking information, because of the general atmosphere at that point in time that Canada was considered to be, as described here, the weak line, that Canada was considered to have let terrorists come through its borders to the United States, all these other features that most Canadians are aware of in terms of the pressures? Isn’t it fair to say that RCMP officer may have felt pressured in 2002 because of these external pressures?

Mr Loeppky : I don’t think our officers felt pressures from the Americans. I think that they felt pressure from the senior management of the Force, from the other partners who have an interest in public safety, to work together to deal with the environment that we were facing at that point in terms of their potentially being another threat, in terms of some of the information that individuals had been in Canada. So, you know, there was increased tension throughout the world, and clearly we put significant pressure on our people to work hard and to follow up on every lead, to use almost a zero-risk based approach in terms of those investigations. And yes, there was international concern. The U.S. had been the subject of the attacks and they were concerned about another one, but se had rightful concerns in Canada that we were subject to threat as well. So we put a tremendous amount of pressure on our own people, as we did on 9/11 when we redeployed over 2, 000 people.

Mr Cavalluzzo : What are you saying, that senior management in the RCMP felt pressure from the Americans and that, as a result of that, you pressured the RCMP officer—

Mr Loeppky : Not at all

Mr Cavalluzzo : Not at all?

Mr Loeppky : Not at all. In fact, my pressure came from my duty as a public officer to ensure public safety in Canada, to ensure that Canadian public was confident that law enforcement was working in an integrated way. The Commissioner appeared on television the day after 9/11 to assure the Canadian public, and my pressure that I exerted in my people came from a sense of duty that I feel.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Okay, Let’s look at the next page, page 13, it is called a “Multicultural Divide”. It says:

“The most critical issue, however, was Canada’s multicultural society. The US was suspicious of ethnic groups in Canada. They viewed Arabic, (North) African, Pakistani, Irani and Iraqi groups as potential sources of terrorists and wanted the Canadian Government to increase surveillance and investigation of these “high risk” groups.”

And it goes on and on and on. Was there any pressure felt from the Americans as a result –even though this is a 2013 hypothetical, was there any pressure from the Americans because of our multicultural society that we have in this country?

Mr Loeppky : No, not that I am aware of.   Page 146 (2)

  William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

  Date: 23-06-2004

  Mr Waldman : I am going to read you what Mr. Elcock, the former Director of CSIS, said:

"We ... do profiling, but we don't do racial profiling. There have been references to this profiling ... on a number of occasions, and occasionally some ... have leaked out."

So he was talking here in an immigration context and he said: What we do is provide immigration authorities profiles of individuals who would be of concern to us so that when reviewing the immigration stream they can look at that stream and select another."

Then he goes on to say the profiles are not racial. They are profiles based on nationality or memberships in certain organizations. They are broad profiles. Does CSIS have profiles?

Mr Hooper : We develop profiles to assist immigration officers in immigration posts abroad to focus their inquiries if they are, say, interviewing a subject for landed status in Canada. They are tailored to the specific environment.

Mr Waldman : Are the profiles based on nationality?

Mr Hooper : Based on nationality?

Mr Waldman : Citizenship?

Mr Hooper : To take a hypothetical example, if you have an immigration officer working in New Delhi and 99 per cent of the immigration work that officer does relates to Indian nationals, certainly our profile would be based on nationality. We wouldn't, for example, pass an Indian national profile necessarily to the immigration officer working out of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Page 81 (2).

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: Okay. There are other new provisions, for example the reference to sensitive sector. As you know, a sensitive sector is defined in a directive that I will be taking you to shortly, they are universities, trade unions, religious organizations, media outlets, and so on. What is the reference here to a “Sensitive sector”?

 Mr Loeppky: This was a policy change that was internally driven. It was actually created before the Ministerial Directive. It was created with regard to concerns that we knew existed in the communities that we might be doing investigations in sensitive areas, such as religious institutions and those types of things, and we just wanted to ensure that we had the appropriate policy guidelines in place to address that.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Okay. Then there seems to be a new paragraph at the bottom there. It says:

“National security investigations are one of the highest priorities within the RCMP.” Is that just upping the ante a bit or has that always been the case?

Mr Loeppky :   I think it was to –well, I know it was to highlight that the risk tolerance for not conducting an investigation, a criminal investigation on national security, the consequences could be significantly higher than a failure to not fully investigate a criminal investigation on an organized crime group that was importing drugs in terms of the harm to people, the safety issues. This was really to emphasize that national security investigations are an extremely high priority where risk is minimized. Page 161.

[…]

Mr Cavalluzzo:  Okay. In terms of the items that you are focusing at the bottom of that page, it says:

“For directives concerning: “This is D.4— …high profile investigations…”

We are going to take you to some of these, that particular appendix. We are going to take you to “c” as well:

“Foreign agencies (other than the U.S) conducting investigations in Canada…”

We are also going to take you to:

“4.d U.S. agencies conducting investigations in Canada…”

We are also going to take you to:

“4.h the conditions for disseminating national security information…”

Which is a separate appendix and we will coming back to that. On the next page, in terms of the reporting structures, there has been a significant change here because when the field is going to notify headquarters you have upped the ante here and you have said you lo longer go to the head of the National Security Branch but had better go to the Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Intelligence. Is that correct? This is at page 3 of 10.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : So that you have made it a more responsible officer that they would be reporting to at headquarters.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Then it refers to the kinds of issues to which you have to notify the Assistant Commissioner. For example, 4, 5 and 6 are new:

“ before starting any national security sensitive sector investigation; 5. during the course of an investigation when you become aware that a sensitive sector may be involved;

And 7: “when it is believed that incident or information will generate media interest”.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : At the bottom of the page there is this exchange program that you have made reference to, the RCMP/CSIS Officer Exchange Program?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Which is new and that is dealt with as well? I need to take you through that. Then at the back of the policy there are, for example at page 6 of 10:

“Counter-Terrorism Incident Notification”

Page 8 of 10:

“National Security at Major Events,”

These items are new as well and I’m not going to ask you questions about those, just to point out to counsel that those are additions—

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : to the policy. Page 162.

- Politique sur les enquêtes de la GRC concernant les « sensitive sectors »

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: Okay. The final direction is related to this description we saw earlier, “Sensitive sectors”. What that states is: This direction will guide investigations of RCMP in relation to security offences and terrorist offences. Then it goes on it says: special care is required with respect to RCMP investigations conducted relating to those kinds of offences. Then it goes on:

“…which have an impact on, or which appear to an impact on, fundamental institutions of Canadian society. Primary among these institutions are those in the sectors of the academia, politics, religion, the media and trade unions.”

Then it goes on in “C” relating to university or post-secondary campuses. It says the RCMP shall:

“…not impact upon the free flow and exchange of ideas normally associated with an academic milieu. Furthermore, the activities of the RCMP shall not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of persons associated with academic institutions.”

Then, finally:

“It is the responsibility of Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Intelligence Directorate at the RCMP National Headquarters…to approve all RCMP investigations involving these sensitive sectors of Canadian society.”

We saw that reflected in that guideline which was an amendment which specifically stated that?

Mr Loeppky : The policy amendment.

Mr Cavalluzzo : The policy amendment

Mr Loeppky : That’s correct

Mr Cavalluzzo: These, once again directions, were in November 2003 and they are still un effect today?

Mr Loeppky : They are. Page 205

- Spécificités concernant les enquêtes qui sont en lien avec la sécurité nationale par rapport aux enquêtes criminelles

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: But in terms of a reporting relationship, it would seem that the reporting relationship, is at the divisional level. There is coordination with headquarters through the NSOB, but the reporting relationship would be through criminal operations at the divisional level?

Mr Loeppky : In national security our investigations, criminal investigations, are somewhat different, though. In terms of a day-to-day criminal operation in a province, the criminal operation officer would obviously make all the decisions about the next steps. In a national security investigation, given the central coordination function of CID, there would be a lot more input in terms of the next steps in that investigation.

Mr Cavalluzzo : You have told us that these operational guidelines are binding on the members of the Force. They are expectations, they are standards, and so on, that are expected to comply with.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo: Is the same true of –I try to get as simple as I possible can because I’m not very bright, but if we look at Toronto, the INSET in Toronto, if I am a Toronto cop and I become part of an INSET and I am involved in national security investigations, am I bound by these guidelines since I’m not member of the Force?

Mr Loeppky : these are the guidelines that we work under un terms of how national security investigations are conducted and those teams are under the command of the RCMP and this is the policy that is utilized.

Mr Cavalluzzo : It is the policy that is utilized, but where does it say that this policy is binding, legally binding on a municipal police officer or a provincial police officer that engages in national security investigations?

Mr Loeppky : There are a number of agreements that are under development in terms of what the expectations are of the police officers, but clearly when they become part of an integrated team that is led by the RCMP with a primary mandate, there is an understanding that the policies and guidelines of the RCMP will be utilized.

Mr Cavallusso : Okay. You say that these agreements are in process. There is nothing in writing yet. We have a draft agreement that I will take you to, but has nothing been signed yet as far as the “A” Division is concerned in the National Capital Region?

Mr Loeppky : No. Those are still being addressed through –to ensure that the appropriate legal issues are addressed.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Right. Okay. But as it stands, without that agreement crystallized or signed, there is really nothing in law that says that the municipal officer or the provincial officer is bound by these guidelines?

  Page 166.

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: We were moving through now to page 3, which is the reporting structure. In regard to paragraph E, it would appear that the reporting structure is to the criminal operations officer or –why don’t you explain to us what paragraph E.2, one, two, three and four mean?

Mr Loeppky : The policy in place at that time was that the national security investigations section would report to the criminal operations officer. If in any case where there was a potential threat to national security or those types of things, it would immediately be transmitted to headquarters, to the national security area within Criminal Intelligence Directorate. It outlined the types of incidents that should be reported and required a follow-up report within 14 days beyond the initial report, and then monthly updates thereafter.

Mr Cavalluzzo : So if I am in the field as an officer, then the reporting structure is straight up through the criminal operations officer. And if there are certain incidents, like a potential threat to national security, suspected criminal extremists or incidents affecting national security, then the officer in charge of the Security Offences Branch be notified as well at headquarters.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : So there is that kind of coordination going back and forth?

Mr Loeppky : Yes.   Page 149.

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: […] There are a couple of paragraphs on which I would ask you questions. It says:

“This direction outlines the responsibilities and accountabilities of the Solicitor General of Canada and the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in matters related to RCMP investigations that fall under subsection 6 (1) of   the Security Offences Act and investigations relating to terrorist offence or a terrorist activity.”

Then in response to the –or in relation to the responsibilities of each if we go to the next page, in paragraph “D”, it says:

“ It is the responsibility of the Commissioner of the RCMP to ensure that operational policies are in place to guide members. It is also the responsibility of the Commissioner to ensure that all investigations with respect to matters that fall under subsection 6(1) of the Security Offences Act and investigations related to a terrorist offence or terrorist activity, as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code of Canada be centrally coordinated at RCMP National Headquarters. Such central coordination will enhance the Commissioner’s operational accountability and in turn, will enhance ministerial accountability, by facilitating the Commissioner’s reporting to the Minister.”

Now, this new direction, what was the problem that the direction was attempting to deal with? What we are talking about here is ensuring that operational policies are in place to guide members in, really, national security investigations; and secondly, a direction that these national security investigations be centrally headquartered –centrally located at headquarters. Was there a problem that this direction was attempting to deal with in demanding this new direction?

Mr Loeppky : Prior to 9/11 we had not experienced the type of an incident that 9/11 produced. We had some investigations touching on criminal investigations dealing with national security. But in terms of a catastrophic event such as this, 9/11 was the first time. We had a small core of people working in headquarters on 9/11; 21, as I mentioned. We were not as effective at that point in terms of having the national coordination that was required to truly have a very comprehensive picture in terms of the situation out there. We have heard in variety if venues, 9/11 Commission in the United States, where they didn’t bring the information together enough. We had started to do a lot more central coordination. But this was in response to the concern that the coordination of these high risk, highly sensitive investigations be very much coordinated from the centre to ensure that we are addressing the right threats but also to ensure that it was more of a hands-on approach.

Mr Cavalluzzo : The date of the direction is November 4, 2003, which is the very same date that Mr. Arar held a press conference upon his return from Syria. So some would suggest that this direction is more in relation to that incident rather than 9/11. Could you elaborate on that?

Mr Loeppky : The discussion around the creation of these ministerial directives had been ongoing between various staff personnel within my organization and the Minister’s area for approximately nine months, I would say. It was to ensure that the direction was something that was appropriate. Page 183.

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo : I would like to ask you certain questions about these policies starting with the one that was in effect between 2000 and 2003, Tab, 34. First of all, what is this? What is an operational policy or manual?

Mr Loeppky : An operational policy or manual is direction to the organization, to its employees, in terms of how investigations are to be conducted, the expectations of the organization on those investigators and the rules around investigations, the broad direction in terms of what is to be done obviously within the parameters of the law.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Once again if I am that officer in the INSET in Toronto, am I bound by these policies?

Mr Loeppky The policies are to provide that direction, right. Page 135.