-Partage de l’information   -les principaux facteurs à considérer avant le partage-

Mr David : I now move to the fourth general topic of your testimony today, and that is dealing with the disclosure in support of enforcement actions. I refer the Commissioner to the Tabs 7 to 11 of the policy binder, in that regard, which is, once again, Exhibit No.4. Disclosure is assessed, as you said already, and as Mr Elcock explained, on a case-by-case basis. There are different factors and considerations that were referred to – that are considered in a disclosure decision and I understand there are four basic factors that are considered. Could you bring us through each of those four factors?

[…]

Mr Hooper : Okay. The policy principles that accompany what we refer to as OPS-601, Appendix 1, speak of the legal requirements and service policy. Again, this brings the policy back to sections 19 (2), (a) through (d), of is CSIS Act. It talks about requirement to protect the identities of sources and employees of the service when making disclosure. It talks about, I guess, the other side of disclosure, the one side being the benefits in making a disclosure and the other side being the down side of making a disclosure and the context that disclosure is made. Specifically, it must be made in the context of the service’s mandate and deal with threat to the security of Canada. It also contains an element of discretion, wherein the officers are admonished to only disclose that information which is absolutely necessary to disclose for the service to meet its operational requirements. The policy then talks about the functional responsibilities of different levels of management and different administrative entities of the service.

Mr David : Tab 8, “Disclosure of Security Information”?

Mr Hooper : Again, this talks about the channels that we have for disclosure to Canadian government officials and entities. It talks about disclosure to holders of public office. It talks about disclosure of information to provincial governments and agencies thereof. It goes on to talk about disclosure of information to foreign agencies and, again, this is something we have heard considerably evidence in relation to.

[…]

Mr Hooper : Those are, I guess, the four basic considerations that we follow when making disclosure, principally to law enforcement bodies, if I may. First of all, the first consideration that you mentioned addresses the jeopardy to service human sources and methods of operation. And this is a very real consideration. We will not, as a rule, disclose the identity of our human sources or methods of operation and would only do so if it were in the contest, as I have mentioned before, say, a serious criminal offence. The second category, I think it spoke to the potential jeopardy to service operations.

Mr David : To the degree of serious to the threat to the security of Canada.

Mr Hooper : Yeah, again, there is a level of latitude in what information we disclose and how much of the information we disclose. Clearly, we would not put unto jeopardy our sources or methods of operation if the seriousness or the eminence of the threat did not justify that form of disclosure.

Mr David : And the importance of the sought-after CSIS intelligence.

Mr Hooper : Again, if I take that or if I circumscribe my answer around a law enforcement case in point, I think it’s probably true that no prosecutor can have enough information. We have to go through a conscious evaluation of whether or not the information that is sought or that we intend to disclose is crucial information, critical information, the success of a litigation or whether it’s just simply icing on the cake.

Mr David : Finally, the political realities of a given disclosure request.

Mr Hooper : I think that when the legislators drafted the CSIS Act and they contemplated section 12 by rolling in a mandate to advise government, they expected or anticipated that there would be a political element to everything that we do. For example, if there were a catastrophic act of terrorism and we wanted to disclose information to a law enforcement body investigating that act, we would probably go much, much farther than would be contemplated by law or service policy and would probably expose the identity of human sources and methods. I think that is a political reality more than anything else. Page 190.

- Règle concernant le partage de l’information en vertu des droits de la personne

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo : Okay. If you were an officer in the field and you had a suspicion that the agency to which I was going to give information may be sending a Canadian to a foreign country, should I share that information?

Mr Loeppkky : Again, the officer has to be satisfied that it is appropriate to share it to further case; that it is consistent with our legislation, our policy, in terms of our duties under section 18 of the Act to prevent crime, preserve peace; to share information appropriately under the Privacy Act. I think you alluded to the sharing of information with someone from United States. Was that the scenario?

Mr Cavalluzzo : Yes. Sharing it with someone from the United States with a reasonable suspicion that the person they have in custody may be sent to a country which clearly does not have the human rights record of this country.

Mr Loeppky : I can’t speak for what is in the minds of people that share information.

Mr Cavalluzzo : But what would the expectation be?

Mr Loeppky : The expectation would be that if any information that was going to be shared was going to result in a breach of that person’s rights, or in terms of what we expect as Canadians, the Charter rights of individuals, then we would be very, very reluctant to share that kind of information, if we knew that is what the purpose it was going to be used for. In fact, we wouldn’t share it.

Mr Cavalluzzo : You said “reluctant”. You wouldn’t share it?

Mr Loeppky : That’s right

Mr Cavalluzzo : Because under the RCMP Act, particularly in section 35, one of the key duties of RCMP officer is that they respect the rights—

Mr Loeppky : The rights of individuals

Mr Cavalluzzo –of individuals

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : If an individual Canadian was going to be sent to a country which, for example, may have engaged in torture, that information should not be shared if you were aware of that. You will agree?

Mr Loeppky : Yes, if you were aware of that when you shared it at that point. Page 145.

- Le partage de l’information et la présomption d’innocence  

Ms Edwardh : However, if you were asked for information, or asked what you had on Jim Jones, I take it you made it clear in answer to the Commission questions posed to you the other day, you wouldn’t simply just give them your conclusion, you would provide the information?

Mr Loeppky: Once you have satisfied yourself that it was in fact appropriate to share the information.

Ms Edwardh : You would give the information, after you have decided?

Mr Loeppky : If they were able to provide a rationale as to why they needed the information, what was their interest in that. We wouldn’t share unless they were able to convince us that it was important from an investigation perspective.

Ms Edwardh : The reference that my friend made to the presumption of innocence really has nothing to do with how you inform the gathering of information, the placing it on SCIS and the leaving it in SCIS. That just doesn’t enter into how the police are operating at that time?

Mr Loeppky : We gather information on a criminal investigation. We always work on presumption of innocence. But in a case where an individual might meet with somebody that is of significant interest that would peak our interest in terms of the nature of the meeting and of why that occurred. I think that is good law enforcement practice to follow up on various leads when appropriate.

Ms Edwardh : So the presumption of innocence, though, doesn’t operate at that level to cause you to say, “We don’t have evidence of probable involvement of any crime, and we don’t have the kind of evidence that would allow us to draw any interferences other than contact, and therefore the presumption of innocence tells us we are not going to put this on the database.” That is what I am trying to get at. It simply –

Mr Loeppky : The presumption of innocence always applies. Guilt is up to the court to find, but our role is to collect information and ultimately evidence for criminal prosecution and that could form part of evidence if ultimately it resulted in a charge.

Ms Edwardh : So it is your view it applies even if the circumstances where someone who then is not involved in any identifiable wrongdoing, is someone who gets entered onto the database and whose information, and the personal information of which can then go down to a foreign police agency if you decide it is appropriate?

Mr Loeppky : I have explained the checks and balances around sharing information and since we use case-by-case need-to-know, and if it was a question about a certain individual, had that individual come to our attention, we would use judgment as to whether it was appropriate to share and what was appropriate to share. Obviously, if there was nothing on our file that is what would be conveyed in terms of background of the individual.

Ms Edwardh : And if there was something on file you would share it?

Mr Loeppky : If it was something that would further the investigation, then it would be appropriate to share it.   Page 194 (2).

Mr Loeppky : There are a number of different caveats that are in existence. The caveats are broad statements that talk about who the document belongs to, the use to which it can be put. The caveat that that applies to sharing with a provincial government, for example, would still have the same themes: who it belongs to, the information, and the restrictions around using that. Page 315 (2).

V.2 Partage de l’information avec les États-Unis

William Hooper (Deputy Director of CSIS)

Date: 23-06-2004

Mr Hooper : How we manage the exchange of information with U.S. authorities is in accordance with the same guidelines that we manage exchanges of information with anybody else. These exchanges are done in the national security interests of Canada and with due regard to the possible consequences of that particular piece of information-sharing. Whether that has to do with   potential for identification of CSIS assets, human   sources, or Government of Canada security assets, these things are all weighed when the disclosure   is contemplated, whether it is with the U.S. or   with any other country. Page 24 (2).

- Règle concernant la collaboration de la GRC avec les États-Unis dans le partage de l’information

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: Under the title “ U.S. Enforcement and Other Agencies” it says:

“Requests Received by National Headquarters” 1.a If a request for assistance on other than security matters is received by National Headquarters, it must be sent direct to the unit concerned for action. In serious case, a copy of the request must be sent to the division headquarters.”

As far as that is concerned, it deals with matters other than security matters, so that it is clear as to the rule there. What is the rule when we are talking about request for assistance on security matters?

Mr Loeppky : When the request comes in it is forwarded to the national security investigations area of CID for processing.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Okay, so just let me understand now. If I am a part of the FBI and I am making a request or I want information from the RCMP, how would that request come in?

Mr Loeppky : In terms of national security?

Mr Cavalluzzo : National security.

Mr Loeppky : It would be from the FBI legal attaché who is attached to the United States Embassy here in Ottawa. The request form the U.S. would flow through him. He would bring that request or send that request to our headquarters. It would then be provided to the national security area for evaluation and preparation of a response.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Would the request go back – or would the fulfillment of the request or the answer to the request go back from headquarters to the FBI legal attaché in the embassy in Ottawa?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : So that is the appropriate relationship as far as national security matters are concerned?

Mr Loeppky : Yes. Page 82(2).

- Règle concernant la collaboration et le partage de l’information avec les agences de renseignement étasuniennes.

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzo: As an RCMP officer, before I sent the name of somebody to Canada Customs to be on the lookout for this person when they cross the border, what is the threshold? Do I have to have engaged in an illegal activity?

Mr Loeppky : You have to be the subject of an investigation that is ongoing. There must be a purpose why, to further the investigation, you might want to monitor that travel. Then there is the appropriate supervisory oversight to ensure that it complies with that requirement.

Mr Cavalluzzo : And you are aware that the Charter of Rights guarantees mobility rights. So that before an RCMP officer should place a lookout on an individual Canadian, there should be very serious reason for doing that. Would you agree?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : On the other side, on the American side, I have heard of something called a watch list. Do you know what I am talking about? What is that?

Mr Loeppky : The only context that I can put to that is the knowledge that I have about a watch list, a U.S. terrorist watch list that I believe is provided to the airline industry for travel purposes, those types of things.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Could the RCMP, or any other Canadian agency, give the Americans a name, a name of a Canadian who it suspects as perhaps being associated with terrorists?

Mr Loeppky : For inclusion in the watch list?

Mr Cavalluzzo  : Yes

Mr Loeppky : No. Our objective would be, and our mandate requires, that we would put that name on the watch list with Canadian authorities. We have no authority to ask a U.S. agency to put a name on a U.S. watch list. That is their decision. Page 130 (2).

- Le partage de l’information avec les États-Unis

Ms Edwardh : […] Again Mr Elcock is there, and the Commissioner starts to talk about trying, if you look down about halfway on the page, to talk about working together with the Americans, the sharing of information, not in Canada but also outside. Do you see that reference?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : And down at the bottom of that page he says:

“Our relationship with the Americans, for example, is also changed. We now have joint forces with Americans who are actually working with us at the borders in a way they weren’t before. They are able to respond much more quickly. The sharing of information and intelligence is going back and forth a lot more quickly. That has also been extended to our allies and key friends around the world. So those are some of the steps that have been taken.” (As read).

Certainly there was an increase in the volume of material shared; fair enough?

Mr Loeppky : The information sharing increased and it increased –I think I referred to a number of reasons. The UN resolutions in 1373 on a commitment to work together were some of the things where Canada committed to work together in a more integrated way in sharing information. Page 225 (2).

Ms Edwardh  : Identified in the database is what I’m talking about. In other words, when a source gives information which is somehow purchased through a benefit or money on this database that we have heard so much about, SCIS, and I may be an officer in an INSET who wants to access information, would I know that the information that I’m looking at comes from that kind of source?

Mr Loeppky : Yes, you would. You would not know the identity

Ms Edwardh : Of course. I’m not suggesting that. Would you know if the information flowed from United States whether that kind of arrangement had been made with a source? Would it be available and readily seen if I was accessing that computer?

Mr Loeppky : The context of the information sharing would likely include some reference to the motivation of the individual, but it might not be very specific.

Ms Edwardh : So you may not know specifically?

Mr Loeppky : That’s right

Ms Edwardh : I think we can also agree that one of the things you –and let’s leave that kind of affect on a source and go to another one. One of the things you would not know is if the information was coming from an American source, an American policing entity like FBI, you would never know whether the interview techniques they use ass muster the scrutiny that you would expect. In other words, you would never know whether there was a leading interrogation, where witnesses were led; whether intimidation maybe used. You couldn’t tell. You expect them to comply with their law. Is that fair enough?

Mr Loeppky : Yes. We expect them to be professional, to have standards that they adhere to, and I believe they do. But unless you are there, you don’t know what the actual tone of the interview was or how it took place. Page 282 (2).

V.3 Information classée confidentielle

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: If we refer to pages 7 and 8, at the bottom of the page in paragraph “N”, as in Nicholas, page 7 of 11 –

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : I says in N.1:

“CLASSIFIED/DESIGNATED information may be released only to an individual who has a need to know and possesses a security clearance or reliability status commensurate with the sensitivity of the information being released.”

You made reference to that earlier. This is the need to know basis you referring to?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Then it goes on in N. and states:

“When sensitive information CLASSIFIED in the national interest is shared with or released to other governments, departments or organizations not covered by the Security Policy and Standards of the Government of Canada, the RCMP must ensure, through written agreements, e.g. MOU, that appropriate safeguards are establishes for the safekeeping of the information. For appropriate statements, see App. XI-1-5.” Page 22 (2).

- Politique concernant le partage de l’information de nature confidentielle.

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: That states “Statements to be included when Sharing Classified/Designated Information” Do you have that?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : Paragraph 1 deals with your relationship with CSIS, which we will be coming very shortly, and it states:

“The following statement must be included on all outgoing correspondence, messages and documents being passed to CSIS… “

And other departments, and so on. And it states :

"This document may be subject to mandatory exemption under the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. If access is requested under that legislation, no decision should be taken without prior consultation with the Departmental Privacy Coordinator of the RCMP.”

The second paragraph deals with when you are giving such classified or designated information to foreign entities. It states:

“The following statement must be included on all outgoing correspondence. Messages and documents being passed to other domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies…

 Mr Loeppky: If it is a written exchange of correspondence, as happens in the first instance, it would bear a stamp on it that caveats that information and provides the restrictions that are noted in this page. If it was an oral exchange of information that I have spoken about earlier, you know, the expectations of the caveats are still implied. So in that case they are not written down, but there is a clear understanding that you respect the source of the information and the restrictions that go with that. Page 30 (2).

V.4 Information relative à la sécurité nationale

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Calluzzo : Let us look at the policy on national security investigations. On the first page it talks about the MOU or the memorandum of understanding between CSIS and the RCMP as one of the references?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Mr Cavalluzzo : And also talks about the national counterterrorism plan. What I would like to ask you about is under ”Policy”. It says:

“Members will not gather information on or investigate organizations engaged in lawful activities.

Mr Loeppky : That is absolutely correct.

Mr Cavalluzzo : So the admonition there is if I am engaged in lawful activity, the RCMP better not be collecting information on me?

Mr Loeppky : That is right

Mr Cavallzzo : That is clear?

Mr Loeppky : That is one of the reasons that the McDonald Commission made the finding that we were investigating legitimate dissent and consequently the recommendations that came out of that.

Mr Cavalluzzo : And then it goes on in C.2 and says:

“Members will restrict investigations to persons within organizations allegedly committing criminal acts and will not unnecessarily expand investigations to the organizations themselves.” I have trouble understanding that. What does that mean?

Mr Loeppky : Those investigations will –we simply don’t go out and commence an investigation without some basis on which to take action upon. We do not target indiscriminately. There has to be a basis for why we would undertake an investigation; that it would be a criminal investigation in pursuit of gathering evidence and would be done appropriately. Page 138.

- National security information : “How do you collect information related to national security investigations?”

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo : What about national security information. How is that collected? We heard had a great deal from CSIS as to how they do it. How do you collect information related to national security investigations?

Mr Loeppky : The large majority of our national security investigations, as I mentioned, are undertaken pursuant to disclosures from CSIS, in terms of their criminal activity and then we move on with the criminal investigation from that point. In fact, a lot of our decisions are based on those referrals. There may be cases where we get some information where we then decide that we don’t have the big enough picture to do anything or we mat need to collect more information to try and put the picture together more completely.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Is there a committee that determines whether the RCMP is going to collect information? I am talking about national security information respecting a particular group or a particular individual.

Mr Loeppky : Within the criminal intelligence area, within the National Security Intelligence Branch, they would look at what do we have on this particular area? Are there gaps that we think we can fill in order to make it something that would be a viable project? And they would identify what that might be. As I said, the majority of our information is provided by CSIS.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Once again I want to ask you, I want to understand this. Certainly CSIS has, as you know, what is called a TARC, a targeting committee which has three levels. In fact, prior to the elimination of the security service from the RCMP, the RCMP had four –level committee system in respect of targeting national security threats or investigations. I just want to know: Is there a formalized structure, committee, consisting of whoever, that will sit down and say, “Yes, we should collect national security information on this target”, whether it be an individual or organization, or not?

Mr Loeppky : There isn’t a – the committee that we use is the committee that I spoke about a little earlier, which is the Criminal Operations Officers, a committee that is chaired by myself, that has the involvement obviously of CID and our process in terms of looking at what are the areas that we want to get into. With respect to organized crime investigations –and I will get tot the point in a minute – a number of years ago we decide that it was very hard to balance what was the capability of group X versus group Y and we developed a model called SLEIPNIR, which evaluates 17 different characteristics. It is a model shared with a number of other countries and adopted around the world, which speaks to the capability of an organized crime group. For example, it will speak to their propensity for violence, to corrupt, to undermine, you know, to launder money. There are 17 criteria. We evaluate the information we have on all those groups, and we decide which one actually poses the highest threat, the highest risk to Canada. That is where we direct our enforcement efforts across the country on organized crime. We have just developed a similar model, but the criteria have very slightly different because perhaps making money profit is not a motivator. So we have moved in that direction, to use a more sophisticated way of trying to identify what, if any, threats there are, what information we have and what we are lacking in terms if being able to undertake an investigation. So it is a much more sophisticated way than guessing.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Let me give you a very concrete example. I am an officer and an INSET, and in the course of my investigation I see something that I suspect may be a national security threat and I want to prevent something from happening. I want to surveil this person. I want follow him or her. What do I do? Is there a committee I go to in order to get authority to follow this individual?

Mr Loeppky : The scenario you have described would dictate to me that you were about to embark on an actual investigation, more that a license number check or something like that. In that case, it would go from the individual to their INSET or NSIS commander, and ultimately to the CROPS officer, because it is important that he be in the loop. He is responsible for criminal operations in that area. But as importantly, he is responsible for all the support areas. If a surveillance team was required or something, he would be the one that would have to make that decision, whether he takes it off an organized crime target and puts it in another one. At the same time here is a reporting relationship to headquarters, because before a national security investigation is undertaken it requires the provision of that advice to headquarters and the support of the Assistant Commissioner in criminal intelligence. Page 108.

- Règle concernant le partage de l’information relative à la sécurité nationale

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: Now, in terms of specifically national security information, if we refer to the next tab, Tab 27, and in particular the last page of Tab 27, we see Appendix I-3-8. It talks about “ Conditions For The Dissemination of National Security Information” and basically contains the same paragraphs. For example, in paragraph 2 it says:

“The following conditions must also be included in all outgoing correspondence, messages and documents being passed to other domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies/departments.”

Then the first one is the third party will require your consent before it is disseminated and the second one setting out that it is the property of the Government of Canada, et cetera?

Mr Loeppky : Yes. Page 34 (2)

- Watch list

Ms Edwardh: I see. All right. Then let me take you to page 32 for a moment, if I could, sir. This is one that Mr. Cavalluzzo touched on this morning. I have to tell you I am terribly confused about these watch lists. It is clear that we have a Canadian watch list. Is that correct?

Mr Loeppky : The watch list ---are you referring to the watch list articulated in here?

Ms Edwardh : Yes. For those who don’t have this document in front of them, there is a little bullet and it says:

“Sharing intelligence to fight against terrorism.”

 Under that it says:

“In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Interpol Ottawa played a key role in faciliting the inclusion and updating of the terrorist watch list on the Canadian Police Information Centre.” (As read).

Which I translate as CPIC. Correct?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : CPIC is a police computer—

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : --that ordinary policemen, not INSETs –although they would have access too –

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : But ordinary police officers have access to CPIC, okay. So what is this referring to?

Mr Loeppky : This refers to the Interpol terrorist watch list that is coordinated, that is put together by Interpol in Leon, France. It includes what they refer to as “red notices”, the outstanding warrants for international –for terrorists who are wanted by any country. That country provides that watch list to the Interpol headquarters in Leon and then that watch list is fed out to the various Interpol offices around the world. What this refers to is the receipt of that Interpol watch list from France and placing it on our system. Page 219 (2).

V.4.1 Les extraditions extraordinaires et la torture

-Extraditions extraordinaires

Mr Loeppky:  First of all, the process of rendition, as you call it, extraordinary rendition of sending people to areas that have less than acceptable human rights records is not a process that we condone or that we support. It would not result in evidence being admissible in Canada. It goes against the Charter and the rights of individuals. In terms of pre-9/11 this was, as I think I pointed out, we had about 150 people in the organization working on criminal investigations on national security and we had not experienced the type of environment that 9/11 brought. If you are asking me should I, in my overall responsibilities, have known that this type of thing was taking place, perhaps, and I accept the accountability for that. If however it was not something we were aware of, it’s not something that would ever cross our mind in Canada in terms of conducting criminal investigations and collecting evidence to proceed with charges, and so it was an element that I was not familiar with. There may have been areas that specialize in the national security investigations area that may have been familiar with that and –

Ms Edwardh . So that would be the area under the control and direction of Dan Killam.

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : Proceed

Mr Loeppky : That may have been familiar with that term and that practice. But I certainly don’t want to offload my accountability I didn’t know at that point and I became aware of it afterwards. Page 327 (2).

-   Extraditions extraordinaires

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 30-06-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo : And would an INSET officer in September of 2002 have an idea that the Americans may have been implementing a policy of extraordinary rendition wherein –let me just explain what that is, and see if you are aware of it. That is where sometimes they would extract an individual from whether it be in the States or a foreign country and send that individual to a country where they thought investigation methods may pursued which would be illegal in the United States. Are you aware of that rendition policy?

Mr Loeppky : It has come to my attention after 9/11.

Mr Cavalluzzo : So after 9/11 and before September of 2002?

Mr Loeppky : The first time that I heard the term was when it was utilized or when it came out in the media that has led to this inquiry. So it wasn’t a term that I was personally familiar with.

Mr Cavalluzzo : If you weren’t aware of the term, were you aware of the practice?

Mr Loeppky : No, I wasn’t. Page 145.

- Torture

Ms Edwardh : […] I want to draw this to everyone’s attention and I am going to do it through you: that in Canada there is no defence to the commission of an act of torture.

Mr Loeppky : That is correct

Ms Edwardh : Even if you are ordered to do it by your superior?

Mr Loeppky : Yes

Ms Edwardh : Even if there is a national emergency, including a state of war or a threat of war, internal political upheaval in the country. There is just no excuse.

Mr Loeppky : Torture is a criminal offence. We gather evidence for prosecution, and anything obtained under torture would not be admissible. So it is just not no. Page 304 (2).