L'affaire Maher Arar

 
     
 
Dépositions (6)
Autres détails
 
     
 
VII- Les EISN
- Formation des agents affectés aux EISN (INSET).
 

Garry Loeppky (Deputy Commissioner of Operations/RCMP)

Date: 06-07-2004

Mr Cavalluzzo: The syllabus [INSET] of the course is set out, really from page 9 through 13, starting with an “Overview of the National Security Program”, ”Criminal Intelligence and the Threats Assessment Process”, “Anti-Globalization/Criminal Protest Movements”, “The Psychology of Terrorism”, “Cultures: Middle East and Islamic Perspectives”, “The Roots of Terrorism”, and so on and so forth, through terrorism financing, and so on and so forth. The one thing that I couldn’t find in going through this syllabus in terms of the training course is that there doesn’t appear to be anything on the exchange of information between RCMP officers and the other agencies, unless I have missed something?

Mr Loeppky : No. There is no specific session that I see in this particular course that speaks to information exchanges. However, as I mention the police officers that come onto these units are not new police officers, they have a significant amount of training in terms of professional police practices and, therefore, you know, I would expect coming from a major investigative IPOC unit, that they are fairly comfortable with information exchanges.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Are there any courses on civil liberties or political dissent, legitimate political dissent, in regard to this training program?

Mr Loeppky : In addition to this? Included in this course? I’m sorry.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Yes, included as part of that course?

 Mr Loekky :   As part of this course?

Mr Cavalluzzo : Yes

Mr Loeppky : Outside of what the syllabus says –I haven’t sat through the course so I don’t know.

Mr Cavalluzzo: Okay. Now, are there any other training programs for national security that we don’t have in front of us?

Mr Loeppky  : Yes. I just might put a little bit of context around why this course was upgraded in July of 2003. It was formerly known as a “National Security Enforcement Course” up until the revisions caused as a result of the amendments to the law under C-36. Prior to 9/11 we had trained a significant numbering of RCMP officers, 350, but very few outside agencies, but since post-9/11 we have trained an additional 172 RCMP and 50 outside agencies in terms of this course. In addition to this course, there is had a two-and-a –half day workshop o Bill C-36 that speaks about the new legislative issues that came out of that, the processes that have to be put in place before it can be utilized, some of the mechanisms that I spoke about the other day in terms of where the authority rests before they can be forwarded to the Attorney General. So it is a two-and-a-half day program that focuses very much on new legislation. Those are the two specific courses that relate to national security.

Mr Cavalluzzo : Now I want to refer to the next tab, Tab 46, which is I understand, a think-tank or a planning session as to the future terrorism, which was a seminar or I guess a group met in May of 2003. Let’s look at page 2 just to ensure we know what we are talking about here. It says:

“The views in this document do not represent any official position, by any organization; they summarize the discussion during a scenario planning workshop on the future of terrorism.”

Then at the bottom of the page, about three paragraph up, it says:

“The purpose of this report is to describe four scenario developed by a group of 25+ participants from the RCMP, a number of government departments and externals experts at a workshop in Ottawa on February…2003, organized and hosted by the Criminal Intelligence Directorate,”

Then there are participants from RCMP, CSIS, Defence, Transport Canada, CIC, DFAIT, Solicitor General, CCRA, CCMD, Justice Canada, OPP, Montreal Police, Québec Provincial Police and Carleton University. So I understand that what we are talking about here is a think-tank presenting scenarios which will or might exist in 2013.   The first reference I would make is to page 12 where it talks about “Canada-US Differences”. Just let me read it for those who do not have it. This one of the four scenarios:

Voir page 142. Page 137 (2).

 
     
 
VIII- Autres détails intéressants
- “Passive sympathy” and membership

 

Mr. Waldman : Could you tell us what the criteria you have between passive sympathy and membership?

Mr. Hooper: I would add to Ms McIsaac's interjection that that evidence was adduced with specific reference to the PKK, which was the organization at issue in the Goven case. In that instance, passive sympathy would include things like participating in demonstrations organized by a front group that had PKK linkages. So a person may or may not know that he would be participating in a protest or demonstration in association with the PKK. In terms of active support, the PKK, particularly in Toronto, had some organizations that were widely known in the community, notwithstanding the fact that they didn’t have a banner out front of the building saying that this is a PKK organization. It was widely understood in the community that they were PKK facilities .   An active supporter might be somebody who would attend meetings at those facilities, who would interact with other known PKK members, who would knowingly give money to PKK initiatives.   And then there is another level which would be says a PKK operative, which would be somebody who was prepared to undertake an act of serious violence on behalf of the PKK, who was known to do that either in Canada or elsewhere.   So there is sympathy, there is affiliation, there is activism and then there are actual operatives in that instance. Page 38 (2).

 
     
 

- Information from our usual array of sources

Mr Hooper: Information from our usual array of sources, whether they are domestic. We may receive information from, say, Immigration Canada. If a person arrives in Canada and makes admissions at port of entry and says I was a member of the Armed Islamic Group when I resided in Algeria that might be something that we would take into consideration. Or if he arrives in Canada as a refugee and says I am seeking refugee because I am a member of the Egyptian al-Jihad that would be something to consider. We may have information from international sources from foreign intelligence services that provide additional clues as to whether or not a person may be affiliated with al-Qaeda generally speaking or one of the constituent groups that are captured under the al-Qaeda umbrella. Page 46 (2).

 
     
 

- Syria country profile

Mr Waldman : I want you to go to Tab 1, the Syria country profile. I'm going to read to you what they say at the bottom of the page about the judicial system?

Mr Hooper : I'm sorry. Which page?

Mr Waldman : Page 8. There are a bunch of unnumbered pages and then -- actually,

the first numbered page is page 8.

Mr Hooper : Right.

Mr Waldman : It says "Government" and then at the bottom it says "Judicial system".

This document says:

"In addition to the military courts reserved for armed forces personnel, the Syrian..."

So it says:

"...the military courts reserved for armed force personnel, the Syrian judicial system includes courts of general jurisdiction and administrative courts."

And it goes on to describe the courts without any criticism at all. I would like you to go to the

Department of State report which is found in Volume II.

[…]

Mr Waldman : I just heard a crash and wanted to make sure my friends are all right.

Do you have that on page 55 of Volume II?

Mr Hooper : Yes.

Mr Waldman : It says "Denial of public trial".

"The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with cases of alleged national security violations are not independent of executive branch control. The regular court system generally displays considerable independence [in civil cases], although political connections and bribery at times influence verdicts."

Then going down two more paragraphs: "Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as military personnel."

So would you not agree with me that the description in the CSIS document is completely inconsistent with the Department of State report in terms of its description of the judicial system?

Mr Hooper : To what extent, sir? Are you referring --

Mr Waldman : Two extents. First of all, this report stays that the military courts are only reserved for armed forces personnel, where the DoS report says that they can try civilians. This report says they are independent, where the DoS report says that the exceptional courts are not independent. So doesn't it concern you that a report that you prepared, that CSIS prepared, that is sent out to police and security officers and displays the judiciary in Syria as independent when that is completely inconsistent with DoS and all the other reports?

Mr Hooper : Does it concern me?

Mr Waldman : Yes?

M r Hooper: That our report is inconsistent with the Department of State report from the U.S.?

Mr Waldman : Not only with the Secretary of State. I could take you to six other reports as well .

Mr Hooper : Yes. I know that when we produce these documents they are facted. I can't speak to what facting was used to make that statement in this particular document. I don't know that it is wrong against the sources that we used, but I do accept that there is an inconsistency between what we say and what this Department of State report says.

Mr Waldman : I didn't want to submerge you with documents, but believe me, any credible human rights source that you were to consult with would say that the military courts in Syria do try civilian cases and indeed that was what was supposed to happen. Mr. Arar was going to be tried in a special national security court. That is what we were told at one point. Any independent authority on human rights in Syria will say that the courts, these courts anyway, are not independent. I put to you that it is of serious concern to me, and I think it must be of serious concern to a lot of people, that CSIS is preparing reports that don't prepare a very objective view of what is really happening in Syria. I wonder why would CSIS do that? Is CSIS trying to portray Syria in a more positive light for some reason?

Mr Hooper : I think if you look at the bulk of that report, I don't think it tries to portray Syria in any particular light at all. It is a statement of fact as we understood them to be.

Mr Waldman : Well, if we go to the human rights section, which is on page 12, I mean -- I find it --

Mr Hooper : Is that ours or the Department of State's?

Mr Waldman : Your page 12. What I find striking about this is the understatements. It says:

"The Syrian government has often been reproached for human rights violations. However, there has been some improvement..." And then it talks about political prisoners, and that's it. If you look at the DoS report, it spends pages talking about the following. I will just read you from page 50:

"The human rights situation remained poor..." -- the last paragraph on page 50 -- "...and the government continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there were improvements in a few areas ... The government uses its vast powers so effectively there is no organized ... opposition." And then if you go on to the next page, 51, under "Torture":

"Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and several penal code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence that security forces continued to use torture, although to a lesser extent than in previous years. Former prisoners and detainees report that the torture methods include administering electric shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim's spine." That's the tire that Mr. Arar refers to in his testimony, by the way. In September, Amnesty International published a report claiming authorities at Tadmur Prison regularly torture prisoners or force prisoners to torture one another. So do you think your paragraph on page 12 is fairly reflective of the human rights situation, in light of this document, sir?

Mr Hooper : Well, I certainly give the Department of State credit for being a much more complete and inclusive document. Page 56 (2).  

Page 204 et suivantes définit quels sont les différents niveau d’intrusion.

Page 210 : Mr Hooper parle des raisons qui font que le Canada pourrait être une cible pour les terroriste : la menace dans l’environnement.  

Page 270 (2): Lorsque le Canada échange de l’information avec d’autres pays, il s’assure de la manière dont l’information a été recueillie. Si l’information est fournie par les États-unis, qui eux l’ont obtenu d’un autre pays, le Canada prend pour acquis que les États-unis ont eux aussi fais les vérifications quant à la validité et la manière dont l’information a été obtenue.

 
     
 
 
     
   
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